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INTRODUCTION
Since
his
appointment
in
2005,
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. has had a dual identity. There is the
Chief Justice Roberts who is playing the long game with his
reputation—the jurist with an eye towards history. This is the
Judge Roberts who dazzled at his confirmation hearings in 2005, the
Chief Justice Roberts who extolled the virtues of consensus in an
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adoring profile in The Atlantic in 2007, and the Chief Justice who
avoided a partisan ruling when he abandoned his fellow conservatives
to provide the fifth vote upholding the Affordable Care Act’s
individual mandate in 2012.1
There also is the Chief Justice Roberts who is determined to
continue to entrench conservative legal principles as the federal law of
the land. This is the Chief Justice who presides over a Supreme Court
that gutted a key provision of the Voting Rights Act in 2013,
invalidated campaign finance laws in a number of cases, and invoked
the political question doctrine to end litigation over claims of partisan
political gerrymandering.2
*

Rodger D. Citron is the Associate Dean for Research & Scholarship and Professor
of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. He thanks Conor Byrnes
and Garrett Wakefield for their excellent research assistance and
Library Director Irene McDermott and her staff, Andrea Cohen, Eileen Kaufman,
Jeffrey Morris, and Bill Petersen for their time and help along the way. Parts of this
article were published earlier in 2020 on Verdict. See Rodger Citron, Notes on an
Oral Argument: The Questions Asked, the Answers Given, and What They May
Augur for the Supreme Court’s Decision in the Congressional Subpoena Cases,
VERDICT (June 29, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/06/29/notes-on-an-oralargument; Rodger Citron, President Trump Clashes with Legal Oversight in Three
Cases to be Argued at the Supreme Court, VERDICT (May 11, 2020),
https://verdict.justia.com/2020/05/11/president-trump-clashes-with-legal-oversightin-three-cases-to-be-argued-at-the-supreme-court.
1
See Roberts Vote Heads to Senate, PBS (Sept. 22, 2005),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/roberts-vote-heads-to-senate (reporting that
“three Democrats” on the Senate Judiciary Committee “admitted Roberts’
performance during his confirmation hearings was impressive, as is his stellar legal
record”); Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATL. (Jan. 2007),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/;
Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see also Joan Biskupic,
‘The Chief’ John Roberts’ journey from ‘sober puss’ to the pinnacle of American
law, CNN (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/27/politics/john-robertssober-puss-the-chief/index.html.
2
See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 532 (2013) (holding § 4 of the Voting
Rights Act unconstitutional); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)
(holding that restrictions on corporations’ independent expenditures for campaign
finance violated the First Amendment’s free speech protections); Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (holding that political gerrymandering
presented a political question outside the scope of the Court’s powers); see also
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012)
(stating that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, “for all
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The Presidency of Donald J. Trump provided both challenges
and opportunities for Chief Justice Roberts. On the one hand,
President Trump challenged the Supreme Court’s institutional
legitimacy.3 While Roberts invoked the image of the umpire to convey
judicial neutrality during his confirmation hearings, that view was
repeatedly questioned by Trump.4 Trump, to name just one example,
criticized “Obama judges”—prompting an unusual public response
from Roberts.5
On the other hand, the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy
in 2018 put Chief Justice Roberts in the center of the Court, making
him the swing vote.6 In 2020, the Supreme Court decided four critical
separation-of-powers cases.7 Roberts not only voted with the majority
in every case, he also wrote the decision for the majority in each case.8
One of these cases, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, involved an issue of
first impression.9 The Supreme Court addressed for the first time a
congressional subpoena for the President’s information, including the
tax returns he never has publicly disclosed.10 The history of the case
practical purposes campaign finance law as we knew it died”).
Noah Feldman, Can Judicial Independence Outlast Four More Years of Trump?,
BLOOMBERG
OPINION
(Aug.
3,
2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-03/four-more-years-oftrump-would-be-rough-on-judicial-independence.
4
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 55 (2005); see Feldman, supra note 3.
5
Katie Reilly, President Trump Escalates Attacks on ‘Obama Judges’ After Rare
Rebuke
From
Chief
Justice,
TIME
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://time.com/5461827/donald-trump-judiciary-chief-justice-john-roberts/.
6
See Jessica Gresko & Mark Sherman, Roberts Becomes the Supreme Court’s Swing
Vote,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERVICE
(June
30,
2020),
https://www.courthousenews.com/roberts-becomes-the-supreme-courts-swing-vote
(“Since the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy in 2018, Roberts has played a
pivotal role in determining how far the court will go in cases where the court's four
liberals and four conservatives are closely divided.”).
7
Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020);
Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer Prot. Fin. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); see infra
Part IV.
8
See infra Part V and accompanying discussion.
9
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2036.
10
Id. at 2027.
3
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illustrates our current divided political landscape.
After Trump was elected in 2016, Democrats secured a
majority of the House of Representatives in 2018.11 It was hardly
surprising, then, that one year later three House committees served
subpoenas on an accounting firm and two banks seeking financial
records of the President, his family, and certain business entities.12 Nor
was President Trump’s response to the subpoenas surprising. He
neither provided the requested documents nor negotiated with the
committees about responding.13 Instead Trump sued, bringing two
different cases that ultimately ended up consolidated at the Supreme
Court.14
In a term with a number of critical separation-of-powers cases,
the congressional subpoena cases posed a special challenge for the
Supreme Court, especially for Chief Justice Roberts. Against the
backdrop of a Court increasingly subject to political pressure, the cases
pitted the political branches against each other.15 Furthermore, they
thrust the Court into previously uncharted territory.
How could the Court decide the case without appearing to take
sides in a political dispute, thereby diminishing its institutional claim
to be more than an umpire? Chief Justice Roberts found a middle
ground and steered the Court through the minefield presented by
Mazars.16 He wrote the decision for a 7–2 majority that established
“special considerations” courts should consider when adjudicating
disputes between congressional investigators and the President.17
This article explores Mazars in detail. Part I sets the stage for
the Supreme Court’s decision by describing the history of the
11

Andrew Briz et al., House Election Results 2018, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/election-results/2018/house (last updated Oct. 16, 2018).
12
See infra Part I. The congressional subpoenas were followed by a grand jury
subpoena seeking many of the same records issued by the New York District
Attorney and served on President Trump’s personal accounting firm. This subpoena
was part of the District Attorney’s investigation into whether state criminal laws were
violated. Litigation over that subpoena culminated in a separate case argued the same
day as Mazars. See also Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2420.
13
See infra Part III.
14
Id.
15
See infra Part IV.
16
Id.
17
Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2035 (2020).
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congressional subpoena cases in the lower courts and the parties’
contentions in their briefs to the Supreme Court. Part II examines the
oral argument before the Court. Significantly, oral argument seems to
have made a difference in the outcome of the case.18 Part III
summarizes the Court’s decision in Mazars. Part IV situates Mazars in
the context of the separation-of-powers issues addressed by the
Supreme Court during the same term. The article concludes with some
thoughts on the significance of Mazars for the Supreme Court in
general and Chief Justice Roberts in particular.
I. TRUMP V. MAZARS USA, LLP: SETTING THE STAGE
A. Litigation in the Lower Courts
The litigation in Mazars began with lawsuits filed by
President Trump in two different federal district courts.
1. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP
The first case, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, arose out of a
dispute over a subpoena issued by a House of Representatives
committee to Mazars, an accounting firm, “for records related to work
performed for President Trump and several of his business entities
both before and after he took office,” according to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.19 The House Committee on Oversight
and Reform contended that the documents were relevant to its
investigation into whether Congress should revise its ethics-in18

See id. at 2034 (“The President’s financial records could relate to economic reform,
medical records to health reform, school transcripts to education reform, and so on.
Indeed, at argument, the House was unable to identify any type of information that
lacks some relation to potential legislation.”).
19
Trump v. Mazars, 940 F.3d 710, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2019). As the Supreme Court later
detailed, “The subpoena demanded information related to the President and several
affiliated business entities from 2011 through 2018” and “statements of financial
condition, independent auditors’ reports, financial reports, underlying source
documents, and communications between Mazars and the President or his
businesses. . . . The subpoena also requested all engagement agreements and
contracts ‘[w]ithout regard to time.’” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2027–28.
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government laws.20
President Trump, asserting that the demand for his records did
not serve any legitimate legislative purpose, filed suit in federal district
court to prevent Mazars from complying with the subpoena. The
district court ruled against the President, a decision affirmed by the
D.C. Circuit.21
2. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG
The second case, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, involved
subpoenas issued by two House committees seeking financial records
from two banks.22 The subpoenas served on Deutsche Bank sought the
records of President Trump, members of his family, the Trump
Organization, Inc., and several affiliated entities, while the subpoena
served on Capital One Financial Corp. sought records only of the
Trump Organization and affiliated entities.23 The House committees
said they were seeking the records as part of investigations into foreign
money laundering and possible foreign electoral interference.24
President Trump and others sued the banks in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting that the
subpoenas were not valid and should be quashed.25 The district court
ruled against the plaintiffs and in favor of the House committees.26 The
20

Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2027–28
Trump v. Comm. on Oversight and Reform U.S. House of Representatives, 380 F.
Supp. 3d 76, 82 105 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 940 F.3d 710, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2028 (summarizing Mazars’ litigation in the lower courts).
22
Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19 Civ. 3826, 2019 WL 2204898 (S.D.N.Y.
May 22, 2019), aff’d, 943 F.3d 627, 676 (2d Cir. 2019).
23
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2027. The House Financial Services Committee’s “first
[subpoena], issued to Deutsche Bank, [sought] the financial information of the
President, his children, their immediate family members, and several affiliated
business entities.” Id. The second subpoena “issued to Capital One, demand[ed]
similar financial information with respect to more than a dozen business entities
associated with the President.” Id. In addition, the Court noted, “On the same day as
the Financial Services Committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
issued an identical subpoena to Deutsche Bank—albeit for different reasons.” Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 2028.
26
Id.
21
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Second Circuit essentially affirmed the district court.27
The D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit rejected Trump’s
arguments because, under then-applicable precedent, the low bar for
Congress to show a legitimate legislative purpose was cleared.28 The
D.C. Circuit upheld the subpoena on Mazars because it served a “valid
legislative purpose” as the requested information was relevant to
reforming financial disclosure requirements for Presidents and
presidential candidates.29 The Second Circuit applied similar reasoning
in its decision upholding the subpoenas on the banks.30 In fact, the
court noted, “the President’s financial dealings with Deutsche Bank
made it ‘appropriate’ for the House to use him as a ‘case study’ to
determine ‘whether new legislation is needed.’”31
The plaintiffs appealed the appeals courts’ adverse decisions to
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and consolidated the
cases.32
B. The Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court
Trump’s lawyers, supported by the Justice Department—which
participated in both cases as amicus curiae33—argued for broad
protection of the President.34 They asserted that the congressional
subpoenas were unprecedented, lacked a legitimate legislative
purpose, and were issued as part of an improper law-enforcement
27

Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19 Civ. 3826, 2019 WL 2204898, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2019), aff’d, 943 F.3d 627, 676 (2d Cir. 2019).
28
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2033.
29
Id. at 2028 (citing Trump v. Mazars, 940 F.3d at 737).
30
Id. at 2028–29 (citing Trump v. Deutsche Bank, 943 F.3d at 650, 658–59).
31
Id. at 2029 (quoting Trump v. Deutsche Bank, 943 F.3d at 662–63 n. 67).
32
Id.
33
See
SCOTUSBLOG,
Trump
v.
Mazars
USA,
LLP,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/trump-v-mazars/
[hereinafter
SCOTUSBLOG] (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) (detailing the proceedings and orders of
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP).
34
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 9, Trump v.
Deutsche Bank, 943 F.3d 627 (No. 19-1540); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant at 10, Trump v. Mazars, 940 F.3d 710 (No. 19-5142);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11-14,
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (Nos. 19-715 and 19-760).
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investigation.35
The House committees framed the case as ordinary, not
extraordinary. They noted that the subpoenas did not seek records
relating to Trump’s actions as President.36 Rather, they asserted, the
subpoenas pertained to actions taken by Trump and others in their
individual (or personal) capacity.37 Furthermore, they argued that
congressional committees routinely seek and receive records from
individuals while performing legislative actions, such as determining
whether existing laws are effective or should be revised.38
Broadly speaking, the issue raised by the subpoenas—legal
access to the President’s records—had been previously addressed by
the Supreme Court in two cases. In 1974, President Nixon lost his
appeal to the Supreme Court when he resisted a subpoena issued during
the criminal investigation of the Watergate break-in.39 In 1997,
President Clinton lost his appeal to the Supreme Court to avoid a
pretrial deposition in the civil case brought against him by
Paula Jones.40 However, neither case was squarely on point here, as
neither involved subpoenas issued by congressional committees.
C. The Political Question Inquiry
Before oral argument, the Supreme Court asked for
supplemental briefing that suggested it was considering whether it
should adjudicate the case. In late April, the Supreme Court directed
the parties and the Solicitor General in the congressional oversight
cases to file supplemental letter briefs “addressing whether the
political question doctrine or related justiciability principles bear on
the Court’s adjudication of” the congressional oversight cases.41
35

Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032–34.
Id. at 2033.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 716 (1974) (enforcing a subpoena over
President Nixon’s objections).
40
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997).
41
The Supreme Court issued its order on April 27, 2020. See SCOTUSBLOG, supra
note 33 (“The parties and the Solicitor General are directed to file supplemental letter
briefs addressing whether the political question doctrine or related justiciability
36
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Although they fundamentally disagreed on the merits, the lawyers for
the parties and the Solicitor General took the same position in their
supplemental briefs: the Court should not, they agreed, dismiss the
cases on political question grounds.42
II. ORAL ARGUMENT IN TRUMP V. MAZARS
In May, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Mazars.
Due to the pandemic, the Supreme Court heard argument by phone.43
The oral argument lasted about an hour-and-a-half—longer than usual
for argument.
Because the Court conducted oral argument by phone, the
justices asked questions in order of seniority. Chief Justice Roberts
allowed each lawyer to make a brief opening statement and then asked
the first question.44 The associate justices then asked questions in the
following sequence: Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor,
Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
Sometimes this format promoted continuity, other times it
disrupted the flow of the argument. As to the former point, for
example, Justice Breyer was able to follow up on questions about
Watergate asked by Justice Ginsburg of President Trump’s lawyer,
principles bear on the Court's adjudication of these cases.”). As noted earlier, the
Court invoked the political question doctrine in Rucho v. Common Cause to end
judicial review of partisan gerrymandering claims. See text accompanying supra note
2; 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019). Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion;
the case was decided by a 5–4 vote.
42
See Steven Mazie (@stevenmazie), TWITTER (May 8, 2020, 5:20 PM),
https://twitter.com/stevenmazie/status/1258869466756251648?lang=en; see also
Jacqueline Thomsen, In Rare Unity, Trump, DOJ and House All Urge Justices to
Resolve
Subpoena
Fights,
NAT’L
L.
J.
(May
8,
2020),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/05/08/in-rare-unity-trump-doj-andhouse-all-urge-justices-to-resolve-subpoena-fights/.
43
Transcript of Oral Argument, Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020) (No. 19715) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]; Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court to
Hear Arguments By Telephone Including On Trump’s Financial Records, NPR (Apr.
13,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/04/13/833292153/supreme-court-to-hear-arguments-by-telephoneincluding-on-trumps-financial-recor.
44
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 43, at 4–7, 31–33, 50–54.
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Patrick Strawbridge.45 As to the latter, even though Strawbridge did
not clearly answer Justice Breyer’s question, the argument changed
course when Chief Justice Roberts moved from Justice Breyer to
Justice Alito.46
This Part examines the oral argument in detail. While oral
argument is not predictive of the outcome, it provides a sense of the
key issues for the justices and may suggest how a justice is likely to
vote.
A. Chief Justice Roberts’ Questions
In
his
opening
exchange
with
Strawbridge,
Chief Justice Roberts zeroed in on whether Trump conceded that the
House has “any power” to subpoena the President’s personal papers.47
Strawbridge acknowledged that the House did have some power or
authority in this context.48 Having secured that concession, Roberts
stated: “So it sounds like at the end of the day this is just another case
where the courts are balancing the competing interests on either
side.”49 Strawbridge essentially agreed.50
Later, when questioning House Counsel Douglas Letter,
Chief Justice Roberts did not seem to be persuaded by Letter’s answers
regarding the presidential harassment that could follow from allowing
congressional subpoenas under the standard applied by the appellate
courts, commenting at one point, “[Y]our test is not really much of a
test. It’s not a limitation.”51
B. Cards on the Table: Questioning by Justices Alito and
Sotomayor
During oral argument, a justice may probe a position by asking
45

Id. at 13.
Id. at 15–16. It must be noted that Strawbridge came back to Breyer’s question and
clarified his answer at the very end of the argument, during his rebuttal. Id. at 95–96.
47
Id. at 7.
48
Id. at 7–8.
49
Id. at 8.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 53. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2034 (2020).
46
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an advocate to elaborate or pressing on vulnerable points. Other times
a justice may appear to become an advocate, asking questions that
reiterate the position advanced by one of the parties. This argument
included both types of queries.
Justice Alito dropped a marker for the conservative justices
when he asked Strawbridge whether a congressional subpoena may be
justified on the grounds that one House of Congress “wants to use the
President as a case study for possible broad regulatory legislation?”52
Alito’s question about using the President as a case study for
legislation put Trump’s position in the best possible light, suggesting
that Congress was singling out the President for scrutiny without any
justification for doing so.
Strawbridge reiterated certain points from his argument and
then hit the softball question out of the park:
[T]o directly answer the question, no, the President’s
personal papers are not related to anything having to do
with the workings of government. . . . You could have
subpoenas directed seeking all of Jimmy Carter’s
financial history simply because he used to be a peanut
farmer and they want a case study on agriculture. You
could have all sorts of requests for medical records, for
educational records, any imaginable detailed personal
records because Congress does have the general power
to legislate in lots of areas.53
Justice Sotomayor did not allow Strawbridge’s answer to go
unchecked. In this case she served as Justice Alito’s counterpart on the
left, a role heightened by the fact that her turn to ask questions came
right after his. Sotomayor’s question noted the: (1) long history of
Congress seeking records from the President; (2) prior Supreme Court
cases articulating the broad “conceivable legislative purpose” standard
to justify a congressional request; and (3) “a tremendous separation of
powers problem” raised by a more demanding standard.54 Then she
52

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 43, at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
54
Id. at 18.
53
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challenged Strawbridge’s claim that the records sought are not related
to the “workings of government”:
[A]re you disputing that the stated purpose of the
Intelligence
Committee
subpoena
at
issue,
investigation [of] efforts by foreign entities to influence
the U.S. political process[,] . . . [that] the financial
records . . . were irrelevant to that purpose and that’s an
illegitimate
purpose
by
the . . . Intelligence
Committee?55
Strawbridge essentially answered yes: the records were not
relevant.56 It was a bit hard to follow his explanation as he mentioned
“presidential finances” in his answer, and Justice Sotomayor
interrupted to point out that the subpoena sought records prior to
Trump becoming President.57 The colloquy became tangled and
ultimately Strawbridge argued that the case law did not support putting
“any finger on the scale for Congress’s asserted legislative power in
this case.”58 Chief Justice Roberts then moved on to Justice Kagan.
C. Cards Close to the Vest: Questioning by Justices Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh
Prior to oral argument, much was made of the fact that
President Trump’s
appointees,
Justice Gorsuch
and
Justice Kavanaugh, had disagreed in Bostock v. Clayton County, the
Court’s recent decision holding that the federal law prohibiting
employment discrimination applies to gay, lesbian, and transgender
employees.59 Gorsuch wrote the majority decision, joined by five other
justices, while Kavanaugh and two other justices dissented.60
Nonetheless, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh vote together far more
55

Id. at 19.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 21.
59
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
60
Id. at 1736–37.
56
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often than they disagree.61 They took a similar approach at this oral
argument: both asked straightforward probing questions of each
attorney.62
Justice Gorsuch questioned both sides on the appropriate
standard for a court to apply when reviewing a challenge to a
legislative subpoena.63 He questioned the attorneys supporting
Trump’s position—Strawbridge and Wall—on why the record did not
establish a sufficient “legislative need” to enforce the subpoenas.64
When House Counsel Douglas Letter presented argument,
Justice Gorsuch pressed him on whether the “legislative purpose”
standard applied by the appeals courts was too lenient, expressing
concern that it was “very broad . . . maybe limitless.”65 Letter’s
answers to questions about this concern are discussed further below.
Justice Kavanaugh, meanwhile, asked practical questions of
both sides. For example, the justice asked Strawbridge how the more
demanding “demonstrably critical [need] standard” he advocated
“would play out in practice in a case like this.”66
With Letter, Justice Kavanaugh returned to concerns that the
“legislative purpose” standard was too deferential to Congress.67
61

See Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh display
independent
streaks,
USA
TODAY
(June
15,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/17/brett-kavanaugh-neilgorsuch-trumps-justices-show-independence/5437009002/ (Justices Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh “have voted with the court’s conservative majority far more often than
not”).
62
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 43 at 28 (questioning Strawbridge on
standards, Justice Kavanaugh asked, “On your argument that the Nixon
demonstrated specific need standard should apply or the demonstrably critical
standard, explain for me how that would play out in practice in a case like this.”); id.
at 46 (questioning Wall, Justice Gorsuch asked “[Y]ou indicated that Congress might
be able to regulate in the area of financial disclosures of the President, and that is one
of the interests the House has asserted here. What more would you require the House
to do to assert that interest?”).
63
Id. at 25–26 (questioning Strawbridge); id. at 71 (questioning Letter).
64
See id. at 25.
65
Id. at 71.
66
Id. at 28. Justice Kavanaugh also questioned Strawbridge about the responses of
the private custodians—the accounting firm and banks—in possession of the records
sought by Congress through congressional subpoenas. Id. at 29–30.
67
Id. at 74.
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Noting hypothetical questions posed during oral argument about
whether, for example, congressional committees could serve
subpoenas for personal records on members of Congress, he asked,
“[I]sn’t the whole point that once you start down this road and this
Court articulates too low a standard, that something like that will start
happening?”68
D. Performance of House Counsel
After oral argument, many commentators also were critical of
House counsel for failing to adequately address these concerns during
oral argument.69 There is some merit to this criticism. Ironically, Letter
stumbled just as much when he was asked friendly questions as hostile
ones.70 After Justice Alito aggressively questioned Letter about the
lack of protection for the President, both Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan gave him a chance to address this concern.
Letter’s answers to these friendly questions came across as rote
and flat. He reiterated the “valid legislative purpose” standard and
indicated that courts should defer to Congress’s judgments about its
legislative priorities.71
Letter avoided making an aggressive factual defense of the
subpoenas. Hindsight is 20–20, of course, but it seems that more could
have been made of the need for Congress to consider additional
legislation in the areas of governmental ethics and foreign electoral
68

Id. at 90–91.
Jonathan H. Adler, Is There Any Limit on the Congressional Subpoena Power?,
REASON (May 12, 2020), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/05/12/is-there-any-limiton-the-congressional-subpoena-power/; Michael C. Dorf, Lawyer Highlights and
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DORF ON L. (May 12, 2020), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/05/lawyer-highlightsand-mostly-lowlights.html; see also Josh Blackman, Was the House Lawyer Unable
or Unwilling to Provide a Limiting Principle in the Tax Return Cases?, REASON
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Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 43, at 62 (questioning by Justice Alito);
id. at 66 (questioning by Justice Sotomayor); id. at 69 (questioning by
Justice Kagan).
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Id. at 61 (responding to questioning by Justice Alito); id. at 66 (responding to
questioning by Justice Sotomayor).
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interference given President Trump’s record in these areas.
Finally, again with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that a
number of the justices—including Chief Justice Roberts—were
looking for Letter to make a concession that would acknowledge the
reasonableness of their concerns about harassment. Yet, he steadfastly
refused to negotiate against himself and maintained that the appeals
courts applied the correct legal standard and reached the correct results
in upholding the subpoenas.72 Letter apparently made the strategic
decision to maintain his position rather than make a concession at oral
argument.
After oral argument, the conventional wisdom was that the
Supreme Court would reverse the federal appeals court’s decisions
refusing to quash the House Committee subpoenas.73 All of the
conservative justices (Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh) seemed skeptical of the House committees’ position. I
predicted, in accordance with this view, that the Court would vote to
reverse the judgments below in a 5–4 vote along ideological lines.74 I
added: “If the Court does reverse, the challenge for the majority will
be to articulate a more demanding standard that does not impermissibly
intrude on how Congress develops and considers possible
legislation.”75
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MAZARS
The Supreme Court decided Mazars and Vance, the New York
District Attorney criminal subpoena case, on July 9, effectively the last
day of the 2019–20 term.76 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the decision
72

Id. at 54; see also text accompanying supra note 18.
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(June
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2020),
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for a 7–2 majority in each case.77 In Mazars, the Court arrived at a
compromise that brought together the four liberal justices (Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) and three conservative justices, with
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joining Roberts.78 Justice Clarence Thomas
wrote a dissent, as did Justice Alito.79 As discussed below, the Court
affirmed Congress’s power to investigate but also recognized the
President’s unique position as “the only person who . . . composes a
branch of government.”80
As Chief Justice Roberts set out in his opinion for the Court,
“[t]he question presented is whether the subpoenas exceed the
authority of the House under the Constitution.”81 In answering this
question, the Court initially noted that it never has “addressed a
congressional subpoena for the President’s information.”82 That is
because “[h]istorically, disputes over congressional demands for
presidential documents have not ended up in court. Instead, they have
been hashed out in the ‘hurly-burly, the give-and-take of the political
process between the legislative and the executive.’”83 The Court
briefly traced this history from a House committee inquiry in 1792
when George Washington was President through the modern era,
discussing examples from the Reagan and Clinton Presidencies.84
A. Congressional Power to Investigate
Starting with Congress’s power to investigate, the Court
initially noted that although “Congress has no enumerated
constitutional power to conduct investigations or issue subpoenas,” the
Lee, the last case of the term. 140 S. Ct. 2590, 2591–92 (2020).
In Trump v. Vance, the Supreme Court held that neither Article II nor the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution preclude, or require a heightened standard for,
the issuance of a state criminal subpoena on a sitting President. 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431
(2020). The case was remanded back to the district court for the President to raise
further arguments as appropriate. Id.
78
Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2025 (2020).
79
Id. at 2037 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2048 (Alito, J., dissenting).
80
Id. at 2034.
81
Id. at 2026.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 2029.
84
Id. at 2029–31.
77
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Court has “held that each House has power ‘to secure needed
information’ in order to legislate.”85
While Congress’s power to obtain information is broad, it is
subject to a number of limitations. Most importantly, the Court stated,
“a congressional subpoena is valid only if it is ‘related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress’”—that is, “[t]he
subpoena must serve a ‘valid legislative purpose.’”86 Furthermore, the
Court noted, “Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of
‘law enforcement,’ because ‘those powers are assigned under our
Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.’”87 Finally, the Court
said, “recipients of legislative subpoenas retain their constitutional
rights throughout the course of an investigation . . . . And recipients
have long been understood to retain common law and constitutional
privileges with respect to certain materials, such as attorney-client
communications and governmental communications protected by
executive privilege.”88
B. Whether a Higher Standard Should Apply When Congress
Seeks the President’s Papers
President Trump took an aggressive litigation position in
resisting the congressional subpoenas. His private lawyers and the
Solicitor General argued that “the usual rules for congressional
subpoenas do not govern here because the President’s papers are at
issue.”89 Relying on case law involving President Nixon’s tapes, they
contended “the House must establish a ‘demonstrated, specific need’
for the financial information” and that “the House must show that the
financial information is ‘demonstrably critical’ to its legislative
purpose.”90
85

Id. at 2031.
See id. (quoting Watkins v. United States, 77 S. Ct. 1173, 1179 (1957)) (illustrating
Congress’s broad power to conduct an inquiry was limited by a legitimate purpose
for the inquiry).
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See id. at 2032 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955))
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The Court rejected this request for a higher standard.91
Litigation over Nixon’s tapes involved claims of executive privilege.
No such claim was made in Mazars, as the congressional subpoenas
sought “nonprivileged, private information, which by definition does
not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations.”92 The Court
explained:
The President and the Solicitor General would apply the
same exacting standards to all subpoenas for the
President’s
information,
without
recognizing
distinctions between privileged and nonprivileged
information, between official and personal information,
or between various legislative objectives. Such a
categorical approach would represent a significant
departure from the longstanding way of doing business
between the branches, giving short shrift to Congress’s
important interests in conducting inquiries to obtain the
information it needs to legislate effectively.93
Although the Court did not adopt a higher standard for the
President, it nevertheless acknowledged the special separation-ofpowers concerns raised by a congressional subpoena served on the
President. These special concerns had not been considered by the
appeals courts below—accordingly, reversal, not affirmance was
warranted. First, the Court noted, “Congress and the President have an
ongoing institutional relationship as the ‘opposite and rival’ political
branches established by the Constitution.”94 Unlike, for example, the
criminal subpoenas at issue in Vance, “congressional subpoenas for the
President’s information unavoidably pit the political branches against
one another.”95
Furthermore, the Court noted, “The President is the only person
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725, 731 (1974)).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 2033.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 2033–34 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51).
95
Id. at 2034.
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who alone composes a branch of government. As a result, there is not
always a clear line between his personal and official affairs.”96 Even
where Congress only seeks the President’s personal records, there is
potential for harassment that may interfere with performance of his
official duties.97 Finally, the Court said, “separation of powers
concerns are no less palpable here simply because the subpoenas were
issued to third parties.”98
C. The Supreme Court’s Compromise & Remand
In balancing the separation-of-powers interests and concerns
raised by Congress and the President, the Court treaded cautiously,
mindful of the long history of political resolution of prior disputes over
congressional requests for the President’s information. It held:
[I]n assessing whether a subpoena directed at the
President’s personal information is “related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress,” . . . courts must perform a careful analysis
that takes adequate account of the separation of powers
principles at stake, including both the significant
legislative interests of Congress and the “unique
position” of the President . . . .99
The Court elaborated on a number of “special considerations”
that should inform such an analysis. “First, courts should carefully
assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant
step of involving the President and his papers.”100 Second, “courts
should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to
support Congress’s legislative objective.”101 Third, the Court stated,
“courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by
96
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Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative
purpose,” adding that “[t]he more detailed and substantial the evidence
of Congress’s legislative purpose, the better.”102 Fourth, turning to the
President’s concerns, “courts should be careful to assess the burdens
imposed on the President by a subpoena.”103 The Court added that
“[o]ther considerations may be pertinent as well” as “one case every
two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive
list.”104
D. The Dissents
As noted above, Justices Thomas and Alito dissented.
Justice Thomas’s dissent was categorical. In his view, the case did not
involve a balancing of competing interests between, on the one hand,
Congress’s authority to investigate and, on the other hand, the
separation-of-powers concerns raised by investigating the President.
Instead, Thomas argued that Congress “has no power to issue a
legislative subpoena for private, nonofficial documents—whether they
belong to the President or not,” and “[Congress] must proceed under
[its] impeachment power” to obtain these documents when
investigating the President.105
In his dissent, Justice Alito expressed great skepticism of
Congress. In his view, “courts must be very sensitive to separation of
powers issues when they are asked to approve the enforcement of such
subpoenas.”106 Because Justice Alito believed that the Court was not
sufficiently sensitive to these issues in its remand order, he
dissented.107
IV. MAZARS & THE COURT’S OTHER SEPARATION-OF-POWERS
CASES IN THE 2019–2020 TERM
In addition to Mazars and Vance, the Supreme Court decided
102
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two other critical cases involving separation-of-powers issues during
its 2019–2020 term: Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau108 and Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the
University of California.109 Seila Law concerned the President’s
removal authority under Article II of the Constitution.110 The Court
held that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), with a single director who could be terminated only for cause,
was an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers.111 It further
held that the “for cause” provision in the statute authorizing the CFPB
was severable.112
Regents concerned the Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS’s) decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program.113 Though the case was litigated and
decided as a straightforward arbitrary and capricious challenge under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),114 it implicated the unilateral
authority of the President to act and to undo prior executive action.115
The Court held that DHS’s decision to rescind the DACA program was
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.116
The contrasts between Mazars and Vance, on the one hand, and
Seila Law and Regents are instructive.117 As noted earlier,
108
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Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1933
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Alan B. Morrison, The Bottom Lines in the Trump Subpoena Cases: More Losses
Than Wins for the President, but No One Is Going to See His Tax Returns Soon, GEO.
WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (July 9, 2020), https://www.gwlr.org/the-bottomlines-in-the-trump-subpoena-cases-more-losses-than-wins-for-the-president-but-noone-is-going-to-see-his-tax-returns-soon/. Discussing Mazars and Regents,
Professor Morrison commented, “Although the Court did not hold that the
congressional subpoenas here failed [the four-factor] test [set out in Mazars], that is
almost certainly what the lower courts should conclude on remand. In essence, the
Court told the House to go back and do a better job if it wanted to enforce these
subpoenas.” Id. Professor Morrison elaborated, “Although the contexts are different,
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Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s decision in each case.118 The
subpoena cases were decided by a 7–2 vote, however, the other two
cases were decided by a 5–4 vote.119 Mazars (and Vance) were more
directly political. Mazars, in particular, put the Court in the novel place
of having to adjudicate for the first time a dispute between Congress
and the President over a congressional subpoena—disputes that
previously had been resolved through negotiation between Congress
and the President.120 The Court’s decision, essentially a compromise,
was careful and cautious. It was a critical institutional victory for the
Court and the Chief Justice that the most political separation-ofpowers cases were decided by a clear 7–2 margin rather than a single
vote. In the Court’s efforts to maintain its legitimacy by appearing to
be neutral, the optics of the vote count matter.
CONCLUSION
During the Presidency of Donald Trump, political divisions
magnified; the middle ground became more of a no man’s land than
ever.121 Chief Justice Roberts is to be commended for his efforts to
keep the Court apart from the political fray. In steering the Court to 7–
2 decisions in Mazars and Vance, Roberts and the Court seemed to win
the long game of preserving the Court’s institutional legitimacy. It also
must be noted that in remanding both subpoena cases back to the lower
courts for further proceedings, the Court ensured that the financial
records sought by the congressional committees and the New York
District Attorney would not be produced prior to the election in
November 2020. The Court thus provided a victory for thenthe Chief Justice’s insistence here in requiring the House to follow what some would
call legal niceties is reminiscent of his 5-4 rulings in the census case in 2019 and the
DACA case this year when he set aside agency actions of the Trump administration
for failing to follow the basic requirements of administrative law.” Id.
118
See text accompanying supra note 77.
119
See text accompanying supra notes 41, 117.
120
Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2029 (2020).
121
Michael Dimock & Richard Wike, America is exceptional in the nature of its
political
divide,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Nov.
13,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-thenature-of-its-political-divide.

2021]

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP

23

President Trump, at least in the short term.
During the 2019–2020 term, Chief Justice Roberts steered the
Court through challenging political waters. However, in law and in
politics, as in life, nothing stays the same. Joe Biden became President,
succeeding President Trump. On the Supreme Court, Justice Barrett
has replaced Justice Ginsburg. The center of the Court has moved, and
it remains to be seen whether Roberts will continue to have the same
influence leading the Court that he had during the prior term.122
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